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Abstract
We design a new algorithm for the Euclidean k-means problem that operates in the local
model of differential privacy. Unlike in the non-private literature, differentially private algo-
rithms for the k-means incur both additive and multiplicative errors. Our algorithm signifi-
cantly reduces the additive error while keeping the multiplicative error the same as in previous
state-of-the-art results. Specifically, on a database of size n, our algorithm guarantees O(1)
multiplicative error and ≈ n1/2+a additive error for an arbitrarily small constant a, whereas all
previous algorithms in the local model on had additive error ≈ n2/3+a.
We give a simple lower bound showing that additive error of ≈ √n is necessary for k-means
algorithms in the local model (at least for algorithms with a constant number of interaction
rounds, which is the setting we consider in this paper).
1 Introduction
In center-based clustering, we aim to find a “best” set of centers (w.r.t. some cost function), and
then partition the data points into clusters by assigning each data point to its nearest center.
With over 60 years of research, center-based clustering is an intensively-studied key-problem in
unsupervised learning. One of the most well-studied problems in this context is the Euclidean
k-means problem. In this problem we are given a set of input points S ⊆ Rd and our goal is to
identify a set C of k centers in Rd, approximately minimizing the sum of squared distances from
each input point to its nearest center. This quantity is referred to a the cost of the centers w.r.t.
the set of points. That is,
costS(C) =
∑
x∈S
min
c∈C
‖x− c‖2.
The huge applicability of k-means clustering, together with the increasing awareness and de-
mand for user privacy, motivated a long line of research on privacy preserving k-means clustering.
In this work we study the Euclidean k-means problem in the local model of differential privacy
(LDP). Differentially private algorithms work in two main modalities: trusted-curator and local.
The trusted-curator model assumes a trusted curator that collects all the personal information and
then analyzes it. The privacy guarantee in this model is that the outcome of the analysis “hides”
the information of any single individual (but this information is not hidden from the trusted cu-
rator). In contrast, the local model of differential privacy, which is the model we consider in this
work, does not involve a trusted curator. In this model, there are n users and an untrusted server,
∗Ben-Gurion University and Google Research. u@uri.co.il
where each user i is holding a private input item xi (a point in R
d in our case), and the server’s
goal is to compute some function of the inputs (approximate the k-means in our case). However, in
this model, the users do not send their data as is to the server. Instead, every user randomizes her
data locally, and only sends noisy reports to the server, who aggregates all the reports. Informally,
the privacy requirement is that the input of user i has almost no effect on the distribution on the
messages that user i sends to the server. We refer to the collection of user inputs S = (x1, . . . , xn)
as a “distributed database” (as it is not stored in one location, and every xi is only held locally
by user i). This model is used in practice by large corporations to ensure that private data never
reaches their servers in the clear.
As minimizing the k-means objective is NP-hard (even without privacy constraints), the lit-
erature has focused on approximation algorithms, with the current (non-private) state-of-the-art
achieving a multiplicative error of 6.357 [2]. That is, the algorithm of [2] identifies a set of k centers
whose cost is no more than 6.357 times the lowest possible cost, which we denote as OPTS(k).
Unlike in the non-private literature, it is known that every differentially private algorithm for ap-
proximating the k-means must also have an additive error, which scales with the diameter of the
input space. This is true both in the local model and in the trusted-curator model, even for com-
putationally unbounded algorithms. Hence, a standard assumption for private k-means is that the
input points come from the d-dimensional ball of radius Λ around the origin B(0,Λ). This is the
setting we consider in this work, where we assume that Λ = 1 in the introduction.
There has been a significant amount of work aimed at constructing differentially private k-
means algorithms that work in the trusted-curator model [9, 22, 12, 20, 14, 21, 29, 25, 26, 24, 13,
5, 23, 16, 18]. The current state-of-the-art construction by Kaplan and Stemmer [18] obtains an
O(1) multiplicative error and poly(log(n), k, d) additive error. That is, given a set of n input points
S ∈ (Rd)n, the algorithm of [18] privately identifies a set C of k centers such that
costS(C) ≤ O(1) ·OPTS(k) + poly(log(n), k, d).
On the other hand, for the local model of differential privacy, only two constructions are available
(with provable utility guarantees). The first construction, by Nissim and Stemmer [23], obtains O(k)
multiplicative error and ≈ n2/3 additive error.1 In addition to the relatively large multiplicative
and additive errors, another downside of the algorithm of [23], is that it requires O(k ·log(n)) rounds
of interaction between the users and the untrusted server. Following the work of [23], Kaplan and
Stemmer [18] presented an improved locally-private k-means algorithm that requires only O(1)
rounds of interaction and guarantees a multiplicative error of O(1) and an additive error of ≈ n2/3.
That is, the algorithm of [18] reduced the number of interaction rounds while at the same time
reducing the multiplicative error to a constant. However, the additive error still remained large. In
this work we reduce the additive error to ≈ √n while keeping all other complexities the same, i.e.,
with O(1) rounds of interaction and with O(1) multiplicative error.
We remark that additive error of
√
n is what one would expect in the local model of differential
privacy, as this turned out to be the correct dependency of the error in n for many other problems,
including the heavy-hitters problem, median estimations, answering counting queries, and more.
Indeed, in Section 5 we show that every locally-private algorithm for the k-means that uses O(1)
rounds of interaction must have additive error Ω(
√
n). Hence, our positive result is almost optimal
in terms of the dependency of the additive error in the database size n.
1The error bounds stated throughout the introduction are simplified; see Table 1 for a more detailed account.
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Reference # Rounds Multiplicative Error Additive Error
Nissim and Stemmer [23] O(k log n) O(k) O˜
(
n2/3+a · d1/3 · √k
)
Kaplan and Stemmer [18] O(1) O(1) O˜
(
n2/3+a · d1/3 · k2)
This work O(1) O(1) O˜
(
n1/2+a · k ·max{√d,√k}
)
Table 1: Locally-private algorithms for k-means in the d-dimensional Euclidean space. Here n is the number of
input points, k is the number of desired centers, d is the dimension, and a > 0 is an arbitrarily small constant.
We assume that input points come from the unit ball. For simplicity, we use the O˜ notation to hide the privacy
parameters ε, δ, the failure probability β, and logarithmic factors in k, n, d.
1.1 Existing Techniques
Before presenting the new ideas of this work, we need to understand the reasons for why the previous
results only achieved an additive error of ≈ n2/3. To that end, we give here an informal overview
of the construction of [18]. This intuitive overview is generally oversimplified, and hides many of
the difficulties that arise in the actual analysis. Let S = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ (Rd)n be a (distributed)
database such that every user i holds the input xi ∈ Rd. At a high level, the algorithm of [18] can
be summarized as follows:
1. Privately identify a set of candidate centers Y ⊆ Rd that contains a subset Y ∗ ⊆ Y of
size k with low cost, say costS(Y
∗) ≤ O(1) ·OPTS(k) + Γ for some error parameter Γ.
2. For every y ∈ Y , let #S(y) denote the number of input points xi ∈ S such that y is their
nearest candidate center, and let #ˆS(y) be a noisy estimation of #S(y), satisfying LDP.
3. Post-process the set of candidate centers and the noisy counts to identify a set D of k
centers that approximately minimizes costY,#ˆ(D) =
∑
y∈Y #ˆS(y) ·mind∈D ·‖y − d‖2.
Step 2 is done using standard LDP counting tools (to be surveyed in Section 2). Step 1 is more
involved, and we will elaborate on it later. For now, it suffices to say that for any
√
n . Γ . n,
there is an LDP algorithm that is capable of identifying a set Y of size |Y | ≈ n/Γ that contains a
subset of k centers Y ∗ ⊆ Y such that costS(Y ∗) . O(1) ·OPTS(k) + Γ. The analysis then goes by
arguing that, for any set of k centers D we have that
costY,#ˆ(D) ≈ costY,#(D) ≈ costS(D),
where costY,#(D) is the same as costY,#ˆ(D) but with the “true” counts #S(y) instead of the
estimated counts #ˆS(y). This means that the set of centers D computed in Step 3 also has a low
k-means cost w.r.t. the input points S, and is hence a good output. The main question is how tight
are these connections. Using the fact that there is a subset of k centers Y ∗ ⊆ Y with low k-means
cost, one can easily show that the connection costY,#(D) ≈ costS(D) holds, informally, up to an
additive error of O(Γ).
The difficulty lies in the connection costY,#ˆ(D) ≈ costY,#(D). As we mentioned, it is known that
estimating counts under LDP generally incurs an additive error of Θ(
√
n). As a result, for every
2
y ∈ Y the estimation error
∣∣∣#ˆS(y)−#S(y)∣∣∣ might be as big as √n. Moreover, when comparing
costY,#ˆ(D) to costY,#(D), the different noises “add up”. To illustrate this point, let us assume that
k = 1, and let D = {d} be a possible center. We have that
costY,#ˆ(D) =
∑
y∈Y
#ˆS(y) · ‖y − d‖2 ≤
∑
y∈Y
(
#S(y) +
√
n
) · ‖y − d‖2 ≤ costY,#(D) + |Y | · √n.
Actually, it can be shown that the additive error only increases proportionally to
√|Y | · n, because
of noise cancellations (as the sum of |Y | independent noises only scales with √|Y |). At any case,
at least with this type of an analysis, the error in the the connection costY,#ˆ(D) ≈ costY,#(D)
scales with
√|Y | · n. Recall that the error in the other connection costY,#(D) ≈ costS(D) scales
with Γ ≈ n|Y | . That is, the error in one of the two connections grows with |Y |, and the error in
the second connection decreases with |Y |. These two requirements balance at |Y | ≈ n1/3, which
results in an additive error of
√
n1/3 · n = n/n1/3 = n2/3. In a nutshell, this is the main reason for
the large additive error in the construction of [18]. The construction of [23] suffered from similar
issues (although their algorithm is very different from that of [18]).
1.2 Our Contributions
The takeaway from the above discussion is that if we could privately identify a small set Y of
candidate centers, say |Y | = O(k), that contains a subset Y ∗ ⊆ Y with low k-means cost, then
the error incurred due to estimating the weights #S(y) would be small, and our task would be
completed. At a high level, our strategy is to first start with a “large” set Y of candidate centers
of size |Y | ≈ √n, and then to privately identify a small subset Z ⊆ Y of size |Z| = O(k) that
has a low k-means cost. That is, instead of trying to identify k centers directly out of Y , we first
identify O(k) centers, and then use these O(k) centers in order to identify a set of k centers from
Y . The main question is how to identify the subset Z ⊆ Y . We next give an informal overview of
our construction. Our construction includes several different components, and we introduce here
only some of them. Any informalities made hereafter will be removed in the sections that follow.
Towards identifying a small subset Z ⊆ Y with low k-means cost, we design a private variant
for the k-means++ algorithm of Arthur and Vassilvitskii [3]. Given an input database S ⊆ Rd,
the (non-private) k-means++ algorithm adaptively samples k data points from the database S, in
such a way that the sampled set has a low k-means cost with high probability. Specifically, the
algorithm of [3] can be described as follows.
1. Sample a point x ∈ S uniformly at random, and let C = {x}.
2. For ℓ = 2, . . . , k: Sample a point x ∈ S with probability proportional to minc∈C ‖x− c‖2
and add x to C.
Arthur and Vassilvitskii [3] showed that the resulting set of centers C satisfies costS(C) ≤ O(log k) ·
OPTS(k) with high probability. Furthermore, Aggarwal et al. [1] showed that when the same
algorithm is executed for O(k) iterations, instead of exactly k, then the guarantee of the resulting
set C is improved to costS(C) ≤ O(1) · OPTS(k). In our case, we would like to design a private
analogue for this algorithm that would allow us to identify a subset of O(k) candidate centers with
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low k-means cost (w.r.t. the input points S). The thing that works in our favor here (in terms of
privacy), is that unlike in the non-private k-means++ algorithm, we are not selecting the centers
directly out of the input points themselves. We select the centers form the set Y of candidate
centers, which was privately computed in the previous steps of our algorithm. The only thing we
need to access the data for, is to compute (or estimate) the probabilities with which we sample
centers from Y .
Recall that we write #S(y) to denote the number of input points whose closest neighbor in Y is
y, that is, #S(y) = |{x ∈ S : y = argminy′∈Y ‖x−y′‖}|. Intuitively, we would like to design a private
variant for the k-means++ algorithm that uses the estimates #ˆS(y) to compute the probabilities
with which candidate centers are sampled. However, this does not quite work. What we can show
is that this strategy works if the set of candidate centers Y satisfies the following two conditions:
Condition 1: ∃Y ∗ ⊆ Y of size k such that costS(Y ∗) . O(1) ·OPTS(k) +
√
n,
Condition 2: ∀y ∈ Y we have #S(y) &
√
n.
While our (privately computed) set of candidate centers is guaranteed to satisfy the first condition
above, we do not have any guarantee w.r.t. the second condition. The reason that the second
condition is useful, is that when it holds, for every y ∈ Y we would have that our estimation #ˆS(y)
is accurate up to a constant multiplicative factor. Intuitively this would mean that the probabilities
with which centers are sampled are close to the “true” probabilities had they been computed from
the “true” counts #S(y).
To summarize our discussion so far, if we could privately identify a set Y of candidate centers
that contains a subset Y ∗ ⊆ Y with low k-means cost, and in addition, every candidate center
y ∈ Y has “a lot” of neighbors in S, then we could apply a (privacy preserving) sampling process to
identify O(k) centers. Afterwards, we could estimate the number of neighbors every such sampled
center has in S, and from that we could post-process to identify k centers with low k-means cost.
First Attempt. One might try to achieve the second condition above by simply deleting every
y ∈ Y such that #ˆS(y) .
√
n. This would indeed mean that, after the deletions, for every y ∈ Y
we have that the updated count #S(y) is at least
√
n. However, this might break condition 1. To
see how this could happen, suppose that k = d = 2, and consider a collection of points p1, . . . , p√n
around the point (1, 0), where every two points pi, pj are at pairwise distance ≈ ρ (infinitely small),
and all of them are within distance ≈ ρ to the point (1, 0). Now consider a database containing
(n−n3/4) copies of the point (0, 0), and n1/4 copies of every pi (so that S is of size n). Now suppose
that Y = {(0, 0), (0, 1), p1 , . . . , p√n}. Since our count estimations are only accurate up to an error
of
√
n, we will have that #ˆS(0, 0) ≈ n − n3/4, and that #ˆS(y) ≈ 0 for every other point in Y .
Hence, if we were to delete every y ∈ Y with a small estimated count, then we would be left only
with the point (0, 0), that misses the cluster around (0, 1), and hence costS(Y ) & n3/4, even though
OPTS(k) ≈ 0.
To overcome this challenge, we revisit the way in which the set of candidate centers Y is con-
structed. We will identify additional properties for the candidate centers, and use these properties
in order to assign input points to centers in a different way (not by assigning every input point to
its nearest candidate center). Our new way for assigning points to candidate centers will guarantee
that the two conditions above hold, and hence, we could apply our private k-means++ sampling
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procedure. The details are given in Sections 3 and 4. We remark that all of our techniques extend
to k-median clustering. The results are stated for k-means clustering for concreteness.
In Section 5 we show that the additive error achieved by our construction is almost optimal.
Specifically, we present a lower bound showing that every constant-round LDP algorithm for the
k-means must have additive error Ω(
√
n). This lower bound follows from a simple reduction from
a task (related to) counting bits to the task of approximating the k-means of the data, together
with known lower bounds for counting bits under LDP.
1.3 Other Related Works
Nock et al. [25] also designed a private variant for the k-means++ algorithm. Their algorithm
is inapplicable in our setting because of two reasons. First, their algorithm is designed for the
trusted-curator model, where we operate in the local model. And second, their algorithm has
additive error O˜(n), where we are aiming for additive error ≈ √n. Recall that in our construction
we sample centers from the (already privately computed) set of candidate centers, and only access
the data to estimate the probabilities with which we sample the centers. In contrast, Nock et
al. [25] computes the exact sampling probabilities (which they can do since they operate in the
trusted-curator model), and then privatize the sampled points using the Laplace mechanism.
2 Preliminaries
In k-means clustering we aim to partition n points into k clusters in which each point x belongs to
the cluster whose mean is closest to x. Formally, for a set of points S ∈ (Rd)n and a set of centers
C ⊆ Rd, the cost of C w.r.t. the points S is defined as
costS(C) =
∑
x∈S
min
c∈C
‖x− c‖2.
For a weighted set S = {(x1, α1), . . . , (xn, αn)} ∈ (Rd × R)n, the weighted cost is
costS(C) =
∑
(x,α)∈S
α ·min
c∈C
‖x− c‖2.
Definition 2.1 (k-means). Let S be a (weighted or unweighted) finite set of points in Rd. A set
C∗ of k centers in Rd is called k-means of S if it minimizes costS(C) over every such set C.
For a set of points S ∈ (Rd)n we use OPTS(k) to denote the cost of the k-means of S. That is,
OPTS(k) = min
C⊆Rd
|C|=k
{costS(C)}.
Definition 2.2 (Approximated k-means). Let S be a (weighted or unweighted) finite set of points
in Rd. A set C of k centers in Rd is a (γ, η)-approximation for the k-means of S if
costS(C) ≤ γ ·OPTS(k) + η.
We require the following folklore lemma, that quantifies the 1-means cost of a center cˆ in terms
of its distance from the optimal center (for a proof see, e.g., [4, Fact 2.3.1]).
Lemma 2.3. Let S ⊆ Rd be a set of points, and let c denote the average of S. For any cˆ ∈ Rd it
holds that
∑
x∈S ‖x− cˆ‖2 = |S| · ‖cˆ− c‖2 +
∑
x∈S ‖x− c‖2.
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2.1 Preliminaries from local differential privacy
The local model of differential privacy was formally defined first in [11, 19]. We give here the
formulation presented by Vadhan [27]. Consider n parties P1, . . . , Pn, where each party is holding
a data item xi. We denote X = (x1, . . . , xn) and refer to X as a distributed database. A protocol
proceeds in a sequence of rounds until all (honest) parties terminate. Informally, in each round, each
party selects a message to be broadcast based on its input, internal coin tosses, and all messages
received in previous rounds. The output of the protocol is specified by a deterministic function of
the transcript of messages exchanged.
For some j ∈ [n], we consider an adversary controlling all parties other than Pj . Given a
particular adversary strategy A, we write ViewA((A ↔ (P1, . . . , Pn))(X)) for the random variable
that includes everything that A sees when participating in the protocol (P1, . . . , Pn) on input
X = (x1, . . . , xn).
Definition 2.4 (Local differential privacy [11, 19, 8, 27]). A protocol P = (P1, . . . , Pn) satisfies
(ε, δ)-local differential privacy (LDP) if, for every j ∈ [n], for every adversary A controlling all par-
ties other than Pj , for every two datasets X,X
′ that differ on Pj ’s input (and are equal otherwise),
the following holds for every set T :
Pr[ViewA((A↔ (P1, . . . , Pn))(X)) ∈ T ] ≤ eε · Pr[ViewA((A↔ (P1, . . . , Pn))(X ′)) ∈ T ] + δ.
As is standard in the literature on local differential privacy, we will consider protocols in which
there is a unique player, called the server, which has no input of its own. All other players are
called users. Typically, users do not communicate with other users, only with the server.
2.1.1 Counting queries and histograms
The most basic task that we can apply in the local model of differential privacy is counting. Let
X ∈ {0, 1}n be a database which is distributed among n users (each holding one bit), and consider
the task of estimating the number of users holding a 1. This can be solved privately with error
proportional to 1ε
√
n (see, e.g., [19]). A more general setting is when instead of a binary domain,
every user holds an input item from some (potentially) large domain U . This can be solved using
tools from the recent line of work on heavy hitters in the local model. [15, 7, 6, 10]
Notation. For a database X = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Un and a domain element u ∈ U , we use fX(u) to
denote the multiplicity of u in X, i.e., fX(u) = |{xi ∈ X : xi = u}|.
Theorem 2.5 (LDP Histograms [15, 7, 6, 10]). Fix β, ε ≤ 1. There exists a non-interactive (ε, 0)-
LDP protocol that operates on a (distributed) database X ∈ Un for some finite set U , and returns
a mapping fˆ : U → R such that the following holds. For every choice of u ∈ U , with probability at
least 1− β, we have that ∣∣∣fˆ(u)− fX(u)∣∣∣ ≤ 3
ε
·
√
n · log
(
4
β
)
.
For our construction, we will also need the following extension of Theorem 2.5. This extension
is obtained from the analysis of [6] with minor modifications (see [18] for the details).
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Theorem 2.6 (Algorithm GroupHist [18]). Fix β, ε ≤ 1. There exists a non-interactive (ε, 0)-LDP
algorithm that operates on a (distributed) database S ∈ Y n for some finite set Y , and returns a
mapping fˆ : Y → R such that the following holds. For every choice of a subset Q ⊆ Y with weights
σ : Q→ [0, 1], with probability at least 1− β, we have that∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
y∈Q
fˆ(y) · σ(y)−
∑
y∈Q
fS(y) · σ(y)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ O
(
1
ε
·
√
|Q| · n · log
(
1
β
))
.
Note that Theorem 2.5 can be obtained from Theorem 2.6 by taking Q = {y} for some domain
element y with σ(y) = 1.
3 Candidate Centers with Additional Properties
As we explained in the introduction, similarly to [18], the first step in our construction is to privately
identify a set Y of candidate centers that contains a subset of k candidates with low k-means cost.
To that end, let S = (x1, . . . , xn) be a (distributed) database, and let C
opt = {copt1 , . . . , coptk } be an
optimal set of centers for the database S. That is, costS(C
opt) = OPTS(k). Also let S
opt
1 , . . . , S
opt
k
be the optimal partition of S to k clusters according to Copt, i.e., Soptℓ contains all input points
whose closest optimal center is coptℓ .
In order to guarantee that the set Y that we are constructing contains a subset of k centers
with low cost, it suffices to argue that for every “large enough” cluster Soptℓ , the set Y contains
a center yℓ that is “close enough” to the optimal center c
opt
ℓ . Here “large enough” means roughly
|Soptℓ | &
√
n. Indeed, smaller clusters can be ignored while only incurring a
√
n additive error,
which is acceptable. “Close enough” means that ‖yℓ − coptℓ ‖ is comparable to the “average radius”
of the cluster: roptℓ =
√
2
|Sopt
ℓ
|
∑
x∈Sopt
ℓ
‖x− coptℓ ‖2. It is easy to see that when ‖yℓ − coptℓ ‖ ≤ O(roptℓ ),
replacing coptℓ with yℓ introduces only a constant multiplicative error to the cost of the cluster, which
is also acceptable. Furthermore, standard arguments show that for every optimal cluster Soptℓ at
least half of the points in Soptℓ are within distance r
opt
ℓ from c
opt
ℓ .
That is, for every “large cluster” ℓ ∈ [k] there is a set of points, denoted P optℓ , of size |P optℓ | &
√
n,
such that P optℓ ∪ {coptℓ } can be enclosed in a ball or radius O(roptℓ ). Therefore, in order to privately
compute a set Y that contains a subset of k centers with low cost, it suffices to solve the following
informal problem:
Problem 3.1. Design an LDP algorithm that operates on a (distributed) database S and return a
“small” set of centers Y such that the following holds. For every subset P ⊆ S of size |P | & √n
(unknown to the algorithm), with probability at least 1− β the set Y contains a center y ∈ Y such
that ‖y −Average(P )‖ ≤ O(diam(P )).
Using the union bound over the k optimal clusters, such an algorithm would identify a set Y
that, with probability at least 1− kβ, contains a center yℓ for every “large enough” optimal cluster
Soptℓ in the sense that yℓ is “close enough” to c
opt
ℓ . Actually, it suffices to focus on a simpler version
of this problem, in which the algorithm gets as input the diameter r of the unknown set of points P .
The reason is that given such an algorithm we could run it in parallel with exponentially growing
choices for the parameter r, and take the union of all the sets Y that we get in this process.
Our construction makes use of an LDP tool of [23, 18] for this problem, called GoodCenters.
This tool, in its original form, was presented by Nissim and Stemmer [23] in a slightly different
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context, and was repurposed for this problem by [18]. Algorithm GoodCenters takes a parameter
r, and aims at identifying a center that is close to every “large enough” cluster of diameter r. At
a high level, algorithm GoodCenters works by hashing input points using a locality sensitive hash
function, that aims to maximize the probability of a collision for “close” items, while minimizing
the probability of collision for “far” items. The hope is that input points which are clustered will be
hashed to the same hash value, while input items that are “far” from this cluster will not be hashed
into that value. Hence, we could privately identify (using an LDP tool for the heavy-hitters problem)
all “heavy” hash values (these are hash values such that “a lot” of inputs are hashed into them).
This is useful since it can be used as a filter that isolates clustered points, which can then be average
with small error under LDP. The actual construction is more involved, and in particular includes
randomly partitioning the data into subsets and applying multiple hash functions to increases the
probability of success.
We identify additional properties of algorithm GoodCenters, which will be useful for us in
the following section. Our contribution here is mostly conceptual – in identifying the necessary
properties and in showing that they are achieved by the algorithm. Most of the technical details in
the construction and in the analysis of GoodCenters have already appeared in [23, 18]. Therefore,
here we only state the new properties of the algorithm, and defer the details to the appendix.
Theorem 3.2 (Algorithm GoodCenters). For every two constants a > b > 0 there exists a con-
stant c = c(a, b) such that the following holds. Let β, ε, δ, n, d,Λ, r be such that Λ/r ≤ poly(n)
and such that t ≥ O
(
n0.5+a+b·
√
d
ε log(
1
β ) log
(
dn
βδ
))
. Algorithm GoodCenters satisfies (ε, δ)-LDP.
Furthermore, let S = (x1, . . . , xn) be a distributed database where every xi is a point in the d-
dimensional ball B(0,Λ), and let GoodCenters be executed on S with parameters r, t, β, ε, δ. Denote
M = 4na ln( 1β ). The algorithm outputs a partition I1, . . . , IM ⊆ [n], hash functions h1, . . . , hM , lists
of hash values L1, . . . , LM , and sets of centers Y1, . . . , YM , where for every m ∈ [M ] and u ∈ Lm
the set Ym contains a center yˆm,u, such that
1. With probability at least 1− β, for every m ∈ [M ] and u ∈ Lm we have
|{i ∈ Im : hm(xi) = u and ‖xi − yˆm,u‖ ≤ 5cr}| ≥ t
16M
· n−b.
2. Denote Y =
⋃
i∈[M ] Ym. Then |Y | ≤ 512·n
1+a+b
t ln(
1
β ).
3. Let P ⊆ S be a set of t points which can be enclosed in a ball of radius r. With probability at
least 1− β there exists yˆ ∈ Y such that the ball of radius 5cr around yˆ contains all of P .
Our modification to algorithm GoodCenters is captured by Item 1 above, together with altering
the algorithm to output also the partition I1, . . . , IM ⊆ [n], the hash functions h1, . . . , hM , and the
lists of hash values L1, . . . , LM (in the formulation of [23, 18], the algorithm only outputs the set
Y ).
4 Algorithm WeightedCenters
In this section we present our main construction – algorithm WeightedCenters. In order to identify
a set of k centers with low k-means cost, the algorithm begins by executing algorithm GoodCenters
on the (distributed) database S multiple times, with exponentially growing choices for the parameter
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r (given to algorithm GoodCenters). Every such execution with parameter r identifies M sets
of centers Y r1 , . . . , Y
r
M that “captures” every optimal cluster whose (average) radius is ≈ r. In
more details, let Copt = {copt1 , . . . , coptk } be an optimal set of centers for the database S, and let
Sopt1 , . . . , S
opt
k be the optimal partition of S to k clusters according to C
opt. For ℓ ∈ [k] let roptℓ =√
2
|Sopt
ℓ
|
∑
x∈Sopt
ℓ
‖x− coptℓ ‖2 denote the “average” radius of the optimal cluster Soptℓ . Now fix some
ℓ ∈ [k] such that |Soptℓ | is “large enough”. As we will see, the application of GoodCenters with
radius r ≈ roptℓ identifies (w.h.p.) a center y that is a good center for the cluster Soptℓ . Hence, the
set of all centers identified in this process (across all choices for r), denoted as Y , contains a set of
k candidates with low k-means cost. We refer to Y as the set of candidate centers.
The main question is how to identify a subset of k centers from Y with low k-means cost.
The challenge is that in the local model of differential privacy we do not have direct access to the
database S. One option to approach this challenge, as was shown by Kaplan and Stemmer [18], is to
privately estimate for every candidate center y ∈ Y the number of input points x ∈ S that y is their
nearest candidate center. The set of candidate centers Y , together with these estimated counts,
can be post-processed to obtain an approximation to the k-means of the database S. However, due
to the amout of noise needed to ensure privacy and the fact that different noises can “add up”, this
strategy only results in a set of k centers with additive error ≈ n2/3+a for a > 0 (arbitrarily small).
We will identify a k-subset of Y in a more involved way, that achieves additive error . n0.5+a.
Recall that an execution of GoodCenters with parameters r, t returns a partition Ir1 , . . . , I
r
M ⊆ [n],
hash functions hr1, . . . , h
r
M , lists of hash values L
r
1, . . . , L
r
M , and sets of centers Y
r
1 , . . . , Y
r
M , where for
every m ∈ [M ] and u ∈ Lrm, the set Y rm contains a center yˆrm,u. By the properties of GoodCenters,
with high probability, for every m ∈ [M ] and u ∈ Lrm we have |{i ∈ Irm : hrm(xi) = u and ‖xi −
yˆrm,u‖ ≤ 5cr}| ≥ t16M · n−b. We introduce the following notation.
Notation 4.1. Given the outcomes of GoodCenters (with parameter r), we say that a point xi ∈ S
(or, alternatively, that the ith user) creates a center yˆrm,u ∈ Y rm if i ∈ Irm and hrm(xi) = u and
‖xi − yˆrm,u‖ ≤ 5cr. Observe that a point xi ∈ S creates at most one center in Y r = Y r1 ∪ · · · ∪ Y rM .
If xi ∈ S creates a center in Y r, then we say that xi creates a center for the radius r.
Remark 4.2. Algorithm GoodCenters construct the candidate centers in Y by averaging (with
noise) subsets of input points (where input point in the same subset are “close” to each other).
Informally, we think of the set of points who “create” a center yˆ ∈ Y as the set of points s.t. yˆ ∈ Y
was computed as their (noisy) average in GoodCenters. However, to simplify the analysis, the
actual definition is a bit different (as stated above).
Consider the execution of WeightedCenters on a (distributed) database S. Let Copt = (copt1 , . . . , c
opt
k )
denote an optimal set of centers for S, and let Sopt1 , . . . , S
opt
k be the partition of S induced by these
optimal clusters. For ℓ ∈ [k] let roptℓ =
√
2
|Sopt
ℓ
|
∑
x∈Sopt
ℓ
‖x− coptℓ ‖2 and let P optℓ = Soptℓ ∩B(coptℓ , roptℓ ).
Note that for every ℓ ∈ [k] we have that |P optℓ | ≥ 12 |Soptℓ |, as otherwise less than half of the points
in Soptℓ are within distance r
opt
ℓ to c
opt
ℓ , and so costSopt
ℓ
({coptℓ }) >
|Sopt
ℓ
|
2 · (roptℓ )2 = costSopt
ℓ
({coptℓ }).
Notation 4.3. We say that an optimal cluster Soptℓ is large if
|Soptℓ | ≥ O
(
1
ε
· n0.5+a+b ·
√
d · log(k
β
) log
(
dnk
βδ
)
log(n)
)
.
9
Algorithm WeightedCenters
Input: Failure probability β, privacy parameters ε, δ.
Setting: Each player j ∈ [n] holds a value xj ∈ B(0,Λ). Define S = (x1, . . . , xn).
1. Constructing candidate centers: Denote t = O
(
1
ε · n0.5+a+b ·
√
d · log( lognβ ) log
(
dn
βδ
))
.
For r = Λ, Λ2 ,
Λ
4 , . . . ,
Λ
n , execute (in parallel) algorithm GoodCenters on S with the parameter
t and the radius r to obtain sets of centers Y r1 , . . . , Y
r
M , lists L
r
1, . . . , L
r
M , hash functions
hr1, . . . , h
r
M , and a partition I
r
1 , . . . , I
r
M ⊆ [n]. Each execution of GoodCenters is done with
privacy parameters ε4 log(n) ,
δ
log(n) . Denote Y =
⋃
r,m Y
r
m.
2. Assigning points to candidate centers: Define the following assignment of users to centers
in Y , denoted as a(i, xi). To compute a(i, xi), let ri ∈ {Λ, Λ2 , . . . , Λn} be the smallest such that
xi creates a center for ri (see Notation 4.1), and let y(i, xi, ri) denote this created center.
Then, let y∗i be a center with minimal distance to xi from
⋃
r<ri
m∈[M ]
Y rm. Now, if ‖xi − y∗i ‖ <
‖xi − y(i, xi, ri)‖ then a(i, xi) = y∗i , and otherwise a(i, xi) = y(i, xi, ri).
% Observe that each user i can compute a(i, xi) own her from i, xi and from the publicly released sets of
centers Y r1 , . . . , Y
r
M , lists L
r
1, . . . , L
r
M , hash functions h
r
1, . . . , h
r
M , and partition I
r
1 , . . . , I
r
M ⊆ [n].
3. Estimating weights of candidate centers: Use an ε4 -LDP algorithm for histograms (see
Theorem 2.5) to obtain for every y ∈ Y an estimation aˆ(y) ≈ a(y) , |{i : a(i, xi) = y}|.
4. Re-assigning points to candidate centers: Let W ={
y ∈ Y : aˆ(y) ≥ Ω
(
1
ε · n0.5+a ·
√
d · log( 1β ) log
(
dn
δ
))}
, and define b(i, xi) = a(i, xi) if
a(i, xi) ∈ W , and otherwise define b(i, xi) to be an arbitrary center in W with minimal
distance to xi.
5. Re-estimating weights of candidate centers: Use an ε4 -LDP algorithm for histograms
(see Theorem 2.5) to obtain for every y ∈W an estimation bˆ(y) ≈ b(y) , |{i : b(i, xi) = y}|.
6. k-Means++ sampling: Initialize Z0 = ∅. For i = 1 to t = 100k do:
(a) Pick a center w ∈W with probability proportional to bˆ(w) ·minz∈Zi−1 ‖w − z‖2
(for i = 1 the distribution is proportional to bˆ(w)).
(b) Zi ← Zi−1 ∪ {w}.
7. Amplifying success probability: Repeat Step 6 for O
(
log( 1β )
)
times and let Z denote the
union of all the sets Zt obtained. Note that Z is a set of size O
(
k · log( 1β )
)
.
8. Estimating number of neighbors for sampled centers: Use an ε4 -LDP algorithm for
histograms (specifically, using the algorithm from Theorem 2.6) to obtain for every z ∈ Z an
estimation ζˆ(z) ≈ ζ(z) , |{i : Z(xi) = z}|, where Z(xi) is the nearest neighbor of xi in Z.
9. Output: Non-privately identify a subset K ⊆ Y of size k with low cost w.r.t. the weighted
set (Z, ζˆ).
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We begin the utility analysis by defining the following two events. The first event states that
the executions of GoodCenters (in Step 1 of WeightedCenters) succeed. Specifically, the set of
candidate centers (resulting from Step 1) contains a “close enough” center for every large optimal
cluster, and in addition, for every candidate center y ∈ Y there are “a lot” of users who created y.
Event CREATION (over the executions of GoodCenters):
1. For every y ∈ Y = ⋃r,m Y rm, there are at least t˜ = Ω(√ndε log (dnβδ)) users that
create y.
2. For every large optimal cluster Soptℓ , the set Y contains a center y
∗
ℓ ∈ Y that was
created for a radius r∗ℓ such that r
∗
ℓ ≤ max{2roptℓ , Λn} and ‖y∗ℓ − coptℓ ‖ ≤ O(r∗ℓ ).
Claim 4.4. Event CREATION occurs with probability at least 1− β.
Proof. Item 1 follows directly from the properties of algorithm GoodCenters and a union bound over
the different choices for r. For item 2, fix ℓ ∈ [k] such that Soptℓ is large, and let r∗ℓ ∈ {Λ, Λ2 , . . . , Λn} be
the smallest such that r∗ℓ ≥ roptℓ . Note that r∗ℓ ≤ max{2roptℓ , Λn}. By Theorem 3.2, the execution of
GoodCenters with the radius r∗ℓ (during Step 1 of algorithm WeightedCenters) identifies a center
y∗ℓ s.t. ‖y∗ℓ − coptℓ ‖ ≤ O(r∗ℓ ) with probability at least 1− βk . By a union bound, with probability at
least 1− β, this happens for every large cluster Soptℓ .
The next event states that the two executions of LDP histograms in Steps 3 and 5 succeed.
Event HISTOGRAMS (over the randomness in Steps 3 and 5):
All the estimates computed in Steps 3 and 5 are accurate to within error O
(
1
ε
√
n log(nβ )
)
.
By Theorem 2.5, Event HISTOGRAMS happens with probability at least 1−β. We continue with
the analysis assuming that Events CREATION and HISTOGRAMS occur.
Recall that in Step 1 we generate the set of candidate centers Y and that in Step 4 we define
the subset W ⊆ Y . The next two claims show that for every center y ∈ Y there exists a center
w ∈ W that is “close enough” to y (even if y /∈ W ). The next claim shows that if y ∈ Y \W then
there is another center y′ ∈ Y that is close to y (but y′ might also be missing from W ). This will
be leveraged in the claim that follows to identify a center in W that is close to y.
Claim 4.5. Let y ∈ Y be a center that was created with the radius r. If y /∈W , then there is another
center y′ ∈ Y that was created with a strictly smaller radius r′ < r such that ‖y − y′‖ ≤ O(r).
Proof. By Event CREATION, there are at least t˜ = Ω
(√
nd
ε log
(
dn
βδ
))
users who created the center y.
Now, since y /∈W , it must be that for at least one user i who created y, we have that a(i, xi) 6= y,
as otherwise a(y) would be large and y would be in W (by Event HISTOGRAMS, the error in the
estimation aˆ(y) ≈ a(y) is of a lower order). There could be two possible reasons for why a(i, xi) 6= y:
Case (a): User i also created another center y′ for a smaller radius r′ < r. In this case, since user
i created both y and y′ we have that ‖xi − y‖ ≤ O(r) and ‖xi − y′‖ ≤ O(r′), and hence
‖y − y′‖ ≤ O(r + r′) = O(r) by the triangle inequality.
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Case (b): User i did not create a center for any radius smaller than r, but there is a center y′
created with radius r′ < r (that user i did not create) such that ‖xi − y′‖ < ‖xi − y‖.
Since user i did create y, we have that ‖xi − y‖ ≤ O(r), and hence, we again have that
‖y − y′‖ ≤ O(r) by the triangle inequality.
The next claim applies the previous claim iteratively to identify a sequence of centers beginning
from y ∈ Y \W and ending in a center w ∈W such that every two adjacent centers in this sequence
are close to each other.
Claim 4.6. Let y ∈ Y be a center that was created with the radius r. Then there is a center w ∈W
such that ‖y − w‖ ≤ O(r).
Proof. First observe that, by the definition of a(·, ·), if a user i creates a center y′ for r = Λn (the
smallest possible radius) then a(i, xi) = y
′. Hence, for every center y′ created with r = Λn we have
that a(y′) is large, and hence, y′ appears also in W . Now consider a center y ∈ Y that was created
with the radius r. If y ∈W then the claim is trivial. Otherwise, by induction using Claim 4.5, there
is a sequence of centers y1, y2, . . . , yw such that y1 = y and yw ∈W , and such that ‖y1−y2‖ ≤ O(r)
and ‖yi − yi+1‖ ≤ 12‖yi+1 − yi+2‖ (since yi+1 was created with a strictly smaller radius than yi).
Therefore, ‖y − yw‖ ≤ O(r + r2 + r4 + . . . ) = O(r).
The next claim shows that the set W (constructed in Step 4) contains a subset of k centers
with low k-means cost.
Claim 4.7. The set W contains a subset W ∗ ⊆W of size |W ∗| = k such that
costS(W
∗) ≤ O(1) ·OPTS(k) +O
(
k
ε
· n0.5+a+b ·
√
d · log(k
β
) log
(
dnk
βδ
)
log(n) · Λ2
)
.
Proof. Recall that, by Event CREATION, for every large optimal cluster Soptℓ , the set Y contains a
center y∗ℓ ∈ Y , which were created for a radius r∗ℓ , such that ‖y∗ℓ −coptℓ ‖ ≤ O(r∗ℓ ) = O(max{roptℓ , Λn}).
Let y∗1, . . . , y
∗
k ∈ Y and r∗1, . . . , r∗k denote the aforementioned centers and the radiuses for which they
were created (ignoring small clusters). Now, by Claim 4.6, the set W contains centers w∗1, . . . , w
∗
k
such that for every large cluster Soptℓ we have ‖w∗ℓ − y∗ℓ‖ ≤ O(r∗ℓ ) = O(max{roptℓ , Λn}). Hence, by the
triangle inequality we have that ‖w∗ℓ − coptℓ ‖ ≤ O(max{roptℓ , Λn}). Denote W ∗ = (w∗1 , . . . , w∗k). If it
were the case that all of the clusters are large, then we would have that
costS(W
∗) =
∑
x∈S
min
w∈W ∗
‖x− w‖2 =
∑
ℓ∈[k]
∑
x∈Sopt
ℓ
min
w∈W ∗
‖x−w‖2 ≤
∑
ℓ∈[k]
∑
x∈Sopt
ℓ
‖x− w∗ℓ‖2
≤
∑
ℓ∈[k]
∑
x∈Sopt
ℓ
O
(‖x− coptℓ ‖2 + ‖coptℓ − w∗ℓ‖2)
= O(1) ·OPTS(k) +O
(
Λ2
n
)
+O(1) ·
∑
ℓ∈[k]
∑
x∈Sopt
ℓ
(
roptℓ
)2
= O(1) ·OPTS(k) +O
(
Λ2
n
)
.
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Now, the cost of a small cluster is at most O
(
1
ε · n0.5+a+b ·
√
d · log( kβ ) log
(
dnk
βδ
)
log(n) · Λ2
)
, and
there could be at most k such small clusters. Taking them into account, we have that
costS(W
∗) ≤ O(1) ·OPTS(k) +O
(
k
ε
· n0.5+a+b ·
√
d · log(k
β
) log
(
dnk
βδ
)
log(n) · Λ2
)
.
In Step 5 of WeightedCenters we define an assignment b(·, ·) of the input points to the centers
in W . If this assignment would simply assign each point to its nearest center in W , then (as W
contains a good set of centers by the previous claim), this assignment would trivially have a low
k-means cost. However, the assignment b(·, ·) does not necessarily match every point to its nearest
center. Nevertheless, as the next claim shows, this assignment still has low k-means cost.
Claim 4.8.∑
i∈[n]
‖b(i, xi)− xi‖2 ≤ O(1) ·OPTS(k) +O
(
k
ε
· n0.5+a+b ·
√
d · log(k
β
) log
(
dnk
βδ
)
log(n) · Λ2
)
.
Proof. Fix a large optimal cluster Soptℓ , and let xi ∈ Soptℓ . By Event CREATION, a center y∗ℓ for the
cluster Soptℓ is created with radius r
∗
ℓ ≤ max{2roptℓ , Λn} such that ‖y∗ℓ − coptℓ ‖ ≤ O(r∗ℓ ). (But it is not
necessarily the case that xi created y
∗
ℓ .) Let y(xi) ∈ Y denote the center with the smallest radius
that was created by xi, and let r(xi) denote the radius for which y(xi) was created. Note that y(xi)
might not be in W . There are two cases:
Case (a): r(xi) > r
∗
ℓ
. Then ‖a(i, xi) − xi‖ ≤ ‖xi − y∗ℓ‖, because a(i, xi) can take the value y∗ℓ if
it minimizes the distance to xi. Now, we either have that b(i, xi) = a(i, xi) if a(i, xi) ∈
W , or else b(i, xi) is set to be the closest center in W to xi, denoted as W (xi). So
‖xi− b(i, xi)‖ ≤ ‖xi−a(i, xi)‖+‖xi−W (xi)‖ ≤ ‖xi−y∗ℓ‖+‖xi−W (xi)‖ ≤ ‖xi− coptℓ ‖+
‖coptℓ − y∗ℓ ‖+ ‖xi −W (xi)‖ ≤ ‖xi − coptℓ ‖+O(roptℓ + Λn ) + ‖xi −W (xi)‖.
Case (b): r(xi) ≤ r
∗
ℓ
. Then ‖xi − a(i, xi)‖ ≤ O(r(xi)) = O(r∗ℓ ), because xi created y(xi). Then,
‖xi− b(i, xi)‖ ≤ O(roptℓ + Λn )+ ‖xi−W (xi)‖ (because a(i, xi) might be missing from W ).
So, in any case, we have that ‖xi− b(i, xi)‖ ≤ ‖xi− coptℓ ‖+O(roptℓ + Λn ) + ‖xi−W (xi)‖. Therefore,∑
i∈[n]
‖b(i, xi)− xi‖2 =
∑
ℓ∈[k]
∑
xi∈Soptℓ
‖b(i, xi)− xi‖2
≤
∑
ℓ∈[k]
∑
xi∈Soptℓ
O
(
‖xi − coptℓ ‖2 + (roptℓ )2 +
Λ2
n2
+ ‖xi −W (xi)‖2
)
= O(1) ·OPTS(k) +O
(
Λ2
n
)
+O(1) · costS(W )
≤ O(1) ·OPTS(k) +O
(
Λ2
n
)
+O(1) · costS(W ∗)
≤ O(1) ·OPTS(k) +O
(
k
ε
· n0.5+a+b ·
√
d · log(k
β
) log
(
dnk
βδ
)
log(n) · Λ2
)
,
whereW ∗ ⊆W is a subset minimizing the k-means cost, and where the last inequality follows from
Claim 4.7.
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We write B to denote the set W with weights {b(w)}. That is, B is a multiset of points
containing b(w) copies of every w ∈W . Alternatively, B is the multiset B = {b(i, xi) : i ∈ [n]}. We
also write Bˆ to denote the set W with the noisy weights {bˆ(w)}. The noisy weights might not be
integers (and, in principle, could also be negative, but this does not happen when Event HISTOGRAMS
occurs). The next claim shows that for every set of centers D we have that costS(D) ≈ costB(D).
Claim 4.9. For every set of centers D ⊆ Rd we have
costB(D) ≤ 3 · costS(D) +O(1) ·OPTS(k) +O
(
k
ε
· n0.5+a+b ·
√
d · log(k
β
) log
(
dnk
βδ
)
log(n) · Λ2
)
,
and,
costS(D) ≤ 3 · costB(D) +O(1) ·OPTS(k) +O
(
k
ε
· n0.5+a+b ·
√
d · log(k
β
) log
(
dnk
βδ
)
log(n) · Λ2
)
.
Proof. For a set of centers C and a point x we write C(x) to denote the closest neighbor of x in C.
By Claim 4.8, for any set of centers D ⊆ Rd we have,
costB(D) =
∑
i∈[n]
∥∥b(i, xi)−D(b(i, xi))∥∥2
≤
∑
i∈[n]
‖b(i, xi)−D(xi)‖2
≤
∑
i∈[n]
(
3 · ‖b(i, xi)− xi‖2 + 3 · ‖xi −D(xi)‖2
)
≤ O(1) ·OPTS(k) +O
(
k
ε
· n0.5+a+b ·
√
d · log(k
β
) log
(
dnk
βδ
)
log(n) · Λ2
)
+ 3 · costS(D),
and similarly,
costS(D) =
∑
i∈[n]
‖x−D(x)‖2
≤
∑
i∈[n]
‖x−D(b(i, xi))‖2
≤
∑
i∈[n]
(
3 · ‖x− b(i, xi)‖2 + 3 ·
∥∥b(i, xi)−D(b(i, xi))∥∥2)
≤ O(1) ·OPTS(k) +O
(
k
ε
· n0.5+a+b ·
√
d · log(k
β
) log
(
dnk
βδ
)
log(n) · Λ2
)
+ 3 · costB(D).
We next analyze Step 6 of WeightedCenters, and show that (with constant probability) the set
Zt obtained after the 100k iterations of Step 6 has a low k-means cost. Our analysis for this Step
of the algorithm is an adaptation of the analysis of Aggarwal et al. [1] to our case. Building on the
analysis of the k-means++ algorithm of [3], Aggarwal et al. showed that when adaptively sampling
O(k) centers from a set of points S (with probabilities proportional to the squared distance to the
current centers), the resulting set of centers has low k-means cost with constant probability (w.r.t.
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S). In our case, however, we do not have direct access to the points in S, and cannot sample points
from it. Instead, we sample the centers from the (carefully designed) set W , where points in W
are weighted by bˆ. We show that even though the sampling in Step 6 is done w.r.t. W with the
noisy weights bˆ, the resulting set of centers also has low k-means cost w.r.t. W and the (noiseless)
weights b, i.e., with respect to B. We have already established that for any set of centers D, its
costs w.r.t. S and B are similar, and hence, we will get that the sampled set of centers also has low
k-means cost w.r.t. S.
Let C = (c1, . . . , ck) be a set of optimal centers for B, that is costB(C) = OPTB(k) and let
B1, . . . , Bk be the induced partition of B according to C. Also let W1, . . . ,Wk denote the partition
of the points in W according to the same centers C. Note that for every ℓ ∈ [k] we have that
Bℓ and Wℓ contain the same distinct points, but Bℓ might contain multiple copies of every point.
Before the ith iteration of Step 6 (where 1 ≤ i ≤ t = 100k) we define
Goodi = {ℓ ∈ [k] : costBℓ(Zi−1) ≤ 40 · costBℓ(C)}
Badi = [k] \ Goodi
Note that the definition of which clusters are “bad” and which clusters are “good” is done w.r.t.
B (that is, w.r.t. W with the exact weights b), despite the fact that we sample centers from Bˆ and
not from B.
Lemma 4.10. In the ith iteration of Step 6, either costB(Zi−1) ≤ 320 · costB(C), or else the
probability of picking a point w from some cluster in Badi is at least 1/2.
Proof. First observe that, by Event HISTOGRAMS, for every w ∈ W we have that 12b(w) ≤ bˆ(w) ≤
2b(w). To see this, note that by the definition of the set W in Step 4, for every w ∈ W we have
that
b(w) ≥ Ω
(
1
ε
· n0.5+a ·
√
d · log( 1
β
) log
(
dn
δ
))
.
In addition, by Event HISTOGRAMS, for every w ∈W we have that |b(w)−bˆ(w)| ≤ O
(
1
ε
√
n · log(nβ )
)
≪
b(w), and hence, for every w ∈W we have 12b(w) ≤ bˆ(w) ≤ 2b(w).
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Now suppose costB(Zi−1) > 320 · costB(C). Then,
Pr

 w ∈ Bℓfor some
ℓ ∈ Badi

 =
∑
ℓ∈Badi
w∈Wℓ
bˆ(w) · min
z∈Zi−1
‖w − z‖2

 ∑
ℓ∈Badi
w∈Wℓ
bˆ(w) · min
z∈Zi−1
‖w − z‖2

+

 ∑
ℓ∈Goodi
w∈Wℓ
bˆ(w) · min
z∈Zi−1
‖w − z‖2


= 1−
∑
ℓ∈Goodi
w∈Wℓ
bˆ(w) · min
z∈Zi−1
‖w − z‖2

 ∑
ℓ∈Badi
w∈Wℓ
bˆ(w) · min
z∈Zi−1
‖w − z‖2

+

 ∑
ℓ∈Goodi
w∈Wℓ
bˆ(w) · min
z∈Zi−1
‖w − z‖2


≥ 1−
2 · ∑
ℓ∈Goodi
w∈Wℓ
b(w) · min
z∈Zi−1
‖w − z‖2
1
2

 ∑
ℓ∈Badi
w∈Wℓ
b(w) · min
z∈Zi−1
‖w − z‖2

+ 12

 ∑
ℓ∈Goodi
w∈Wℓ
b(w) · min
z∈Zi−1
‖w − z‖2


= 1− 4 ·
∑
ℓ∈Goodi
w∈Wℓ
b(w) · min
z∈Zi−1
‖w − z‖2
∑
w∈W
b(w) · min
z∈Zi−1
‖w − z‖2
= 1− 4 ·
∑
ℓ∈Goodi
costBℓ(Zi−1)
costB(Zi−1)
≥ 1− 4 ·
∑
ℓ∈Goodi
40 · costBℓ(C)
320 · costB(C) ≥
1
2
.
Recall that C = (c1, . . . , ck) denotes an optimal set of centers for B, and that B1, . . . , Bk
denotes the partition of B according to C. For ℓ ∈ [k] let rℓ =
√
2
|Bℓ|
∑
x∈Bℓ ‖x− cℓ‖2, and let
Bℓ = Bℓ∩B(cℓ, rℓ). Intuitively, Bℓ contains the points in Bℓ that are “close enough” to the optimal
center cℓ, so that if we sample a point w ∈ Bℓ then the ℓth cluster would become good.
We have already established that in every iteration i, either the set of centers Zi already has a
low enough k-means cost, or with high probability we pick a point w that belongs to a bad cluster
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Bℓ. We will now further show that with constant probability this point in fact belongs to Bℓ ⊆ Bℓ,
in which case the cluster Bℓ becomes good. This will mean that with constant probability a bad
cluster becomes good, and hence, after O(k) iterations either all clusters are good or Zi already
has low k-means cost.
First note that for every ℓ ∈ [k] we have that |Bℓ| ≥ 12 |Bℓ|, as otherwise less than half of the
points in Bℓ are within distance rℓ to cℓ, and so costBℓ({cℓ}) > |Bℓ|2 · (rℓ)2 = costBℓ({cℓ}). So Pℓ
contains a lot of points. To show that a point is picked from Bℓ with high probability, we also
analyze in the next lemma the weights of points in Bℓ in comparison to the weights of the other
points in Bℓ. This will show that, conditioning on the next point w being chosen from Bℓ, there is
a constant probability of it in fact being in Bℓ. We will useWℓ to denote the set containing every
point appearing in the multiset Bℓ.
Lemma 4.11. For the point w picked during the ith iteration we have that
Pr[w ∈ Bℓ | w ∈ Bℓ and Bℓ ∈ Badi] =
∑
w∈Wℓ
bˆ(w) · min
z∈Zi−1
‖w − z‖2
∑
w∈Wℓ
bˆ(w) · min
z∈Zi−1
‖w − z‖2 ≥
1
24
.
Proof. We use Zi−1(cℓ) to denote the closest point in Zi−1 to the optimal center cℓ. We denote
s = ‖cℓ − Zi−1(cℓ)‖. Using Lemma 2.3 we get that∑
w∈Wℓ
bˆ(w) · min
z∈Zi−1
‖w − z‖2 ≤
∑
w∈Wℓ
2b(w) · min
z∈Zi−1
‖w − z‖2
= 2 ·
∑
w∈Bℓ
min
z∈Zi−1
‖w − z‖2
≤ 2 ·
∑
w∈Bℓ
‖w − Zi−1(cℓ)‖2
=

2 · ∑
w∈Bℓ
‖w − cℓ‖2

+ 2|Bℓ| · ‖cℓ − Zi−1(cℓ)‖2
= |Bℓ| ·
(
r2ℓ + 2s
2
)
.
In addition, for every z ∈ Zi−1 and w ∈ Bℓ we have that
‖w − z‖ ≥ ‖cℓ − z‖ − ‖w − cℓ‖ (by the triangle inequality)
≥ ‖cℓ − Zi−1(cℓ)‖ − ‖w − cℓ‖ (since Zi−1(cℓ) is the closest to cℓ in Zi−1)
≥ ‖cℓ − Zi−1(cℓ)‖ − rℓ (since w ∈ Bℓ and hence within distance rℓ from cℓ)
In addition, ‖cℓ − Zi−1(cℓ)‖ − rℓ ≥ 0, since otherwise Bℓ would not be bad, and hence
‖w − z‖ ≥ ‖cℓ − Zi−1(cℓ)‖ − rℓ ≥ 0.
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So we also have that ‖w − z‖2 ≥ (‖cℓ − Zi−1(cℓ)‖ − rℓ)2 = (s− rℓ)2. Now,
∑
w∈Wℓ
bˆ(w) · min
z∈Zi−1
‖w − z‖2 ≥
∑
w∈Wℓ
1
2
b(w) · min
z∈Zi−1
‖w − z‖2
=
1
2
·
∑
w∈Bℓ
min
z∈Zi−1
‖w − z‖2
≥ 1
2
·
∑
w∈Bℓ
(s− rℓ)2
=
|Bℓ|
2
· (s− rℓ)2
≥ |Bℓ|
4
· (s− rℓ)2.
We therefore get that
Pr[w ∈ Bℓ | w ∈ Bℓ and Bℓ ∈ Badi] =
∑
w∈Wℓ
bˆ(w) · min
z∈Zi−1
‖w − z‖2
∑
w∈Wℓ
bˆ(w) · min
z∈Zi−1
‖w − z‖2
≥ |Bℓ| · (s− rℓ)
2/4
|Bℓ| ·
(
r2ℓ + 2s
2
)
≥ 1
8
· (s− rℓ)
2
s2 + r2ℓ
=
1
8
·
(
1− 2 · s · rℓ
s2 + r2ℓ
)
≥ 1
8
·
(
1− 2 · s · rℓ
s2
)
=
1
8
·
(
1− 2 · rℓ
s
)
≥ 1
24
,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that s ≥ 3rℓ, which holds since Bℓ is a bad cluster.
So, as long as the set of centers Zi is not “good enough”, in every iteration of Step 6 there is
a constant probability of picking a point w that makes at least one “bad” cluster become “good”.
As the next lemma shows, this means that after the O(k) iterations of Step 6, either all clusters
are good or Zi already has low k-means cost.
Lemma 4.12. The set Zt obtained after the 100k iterations of Step 6 satisfies costB(Zt) ≤ 320 ·
OPTB(k) with probability at least 1/100.
Proof sketch. For every i ∈ [100k] define an indicator variable Xi, where
Xi =
{
0 if costB(Zi−1) ≤ 320 ·OPTB(k) or | Badi+1 | < | Badi |
1 otherwise
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By Lemma 4.10 and Lemma 4.11, we have that Pr[Xi = 0] ≥ 12 · 124 = 148 . Hence, E[Xi] ≤ 4748 .
So, by Markov’s inequality we get that Pr[X1 + · · ·+X100k ≥ 99k] ≤ 0.99, which means that with
probability at least 0.01 there are at least k indicators that attain the value 0. In this case we
either have that costB(Zt) ≤ 320 · OPTB(k), or we have that there are no more bad clusters, in
which case we again get that costB(Zt) ≤ 320 ·OPTB(k).
Remark 4.13. We did not attempt to optimize any of the constants throughout the analysis. In
particular, the analysis of Lemma 4.12 could be tightened using the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality.
Let Zζ denote the set Z (from Step 7) with the weights ζ (from Step 8), and let Zζˆ denote the
same set with the weights ζˆ (also from Step 8). As the previous claim shows, every application
of Step 6 return a set Zt that, with constant probability, has a low k-means cost w.r.t. B. In
Step 7 we repeat Step 6 for O(log 1β ) times, and generate the set Z as the union of all the resulting
sets Zt. Hence, with high probability, the set Z obtained in Step 7 has a low k-means cost w.r.t.
B. The next claim further shows that in this case, for every set of centers D ⊆ Rd we have that
costZζ (D) ≈ costS(D). That is, the next claim relates the k-means cost of every set of centers D
w.r.t. the input database S and w.r.t. the set Z with the “true” weights ζ.
Claim 4.14. With probability at least 1− β, for every set of centers D ⊆ Rd we have
costZζ (D) ≤ 3 · costS(D) +O(1) ·OPTS(k) +O
(
k
ε
· n0.5+a+b ·
√
d · log(k
β
) log
(
dn
δ
)
log(n) · Λ2
)
,
and,
costS(D) ≤ 3 · costZζ(D) +O(1) ·OPTS(k) +O
(
k
ε
· n0.5+a+b ·
√
d · log(k
β
) log
(
dn
δ
)
log(n) · Λ2
)
.
Proof. By Lemma 4.12, every execution of Step 6 results in a set Zt such that costB(Zt) ≤ 320 ·
OPTB(k) with probability at least 1/100. As the set Z (from Step 7) is constructed as the union
of the outcomes of O(log 1β ) applications of Step 6, with probability at least 1 − β we have that
costB(Z) ≤ 320 ·OPTB(k). In this case, by Claim 4.9 we have
costS(Z) ≤ 3 · costB(Z) +O(1) ·OPTS(k) +O
(
k
ε
· n0.5+a+b ·
√
d · log(k
β
) log
(
dn
δ
)
log(n) · Λ2
)
≤ O(1) ·OPTB(k) +O(1) ·OPTS(k) +O
(
k
ε
· n0.5+a+b ·
√
d · log(k
β
) log
(
dn
δ
)
log(n) · Λ2
)
≤ O(1) ·OPTS(k) +O(1) ·OPTS(k) +O
(
k
ε
· n0.5+a+b ·
√
d · log(k
β
) log
(
dn
δ
)
log(n) · Λ2
)
= O(1) ·OPTS(k) +O
(
k
ε
· n0.5+a+b ·
√
d · log(k
β
) log
(
dn
δ
)
log(n) · Λ2
)
.
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Now, for every set of centers D ⊆ Rd we have
costZζ(D) =
∑
z∈Z
ζ(z) · ‖z −D(z)‖2
=
∑
z∈S
‖Z(x)−D(Z(x))‖2
≤
∑
x∈S
‖Z(x)−D(x)‖2
≤
∑
x∈S
(‖Z(x)− x‖+ ‖x−D(x)‖)2
≤
∑
x∈S
(
3 · ‖Z(x)− x‖2 + 3 · ‖x−D(x)‖2)
= 3 · costS(Z) + 3 · costS(D)
≤ 3 · costS(D) +O(1) ·OPTS(k) +O
(
k
ε
· n0.5+a+b ·
√
d · log(k
β
) log
(
dn
δ
)
log(n) · Λ2
)
.
Similarly,
costS(D) =
∑
x∈S
‖x−D(x)‖2
≤
∑
x∈S
‖x−D(Z(x))‖2
≤
∑
x∈S
(
3 · ‖x− Z(x)‖2 + 3 · ‖Z(x)−D(Z(x))‖2)
= 3 · costS(Z) + 3 · costZζ(D)
≤ 3 · costZζ (D) +O(1) ·OPTS(k) +O
(
k
ε
· n0.5+a+b ·
√
d · log(k
β
) log
(
dn
δ
)
log(n) · Λ2
)
.
The next claim relates the k-means cost of every set of k centers D ⊆ Y w.r.t. the set Zζ to its
cost w.r.t. Zζˆ .
Claim 4.15. With probability at least 1− β, for every subset D ⊆ Y of size |D| = k we have
∣∣∣costZζ (D)− costZζˆ(D)
∣∣∣ ≤ O
(
k1.5 · Λ2
ε
·
√
n · log
(
n
β
)
log(
1
β
)
)
.
Proof. Fix a set D = (d1, . . . , dk) of k centers, and let G
D
1 , . . . , G
D
k denote the partition of the
points in Z, assigning them to the centers in D. That is, for every ℓ ∈ [k] and z ∈ GDℓ we have that
dℓ = argmind∈D‖z − d‖. Fix ℓ ∈ [k]. By the properties of algorithm GroupHist (Theorem 2.6),
with probability at least 1− β
k·nk we have that∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
z∈GD
ℓ
(ζ(z)− ζˆ(z)) · ‖z − dℓ‖2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ O
(
Λ2
ε
·
√
|GDℓ | · kn · log
(
n
β
))
.
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Using the union bound, this holds simultaneously for every ℓ ∈ [k] and every subset D ⊆ Y of size
k with probability at least 1− β. In this case, for every such D ⊆ Y we have
costZζ (D) =
∑
ℓ∈[k]
∑
z∈GD
ℓ
ζ(z) · ‖z − dℓ‖2
=
∑
ℓ∈[k]
∑
z∈GD
ℓ
ζˆ(z) · ‖z − dℓ‖2 +
∑
ℓ∈[k]
∑
z∈GD
ℓ
(ζ(z)− ζˆ(z)) · ‖z − dℓ‖2
= costZ
ζˆ
(D) +
∑
ℓ∈[k]
∑
z∈GD
ℓ
(ζ(z)− ζˆ(z)) · ‖z − dℓ‖2
≤ costZ
ζˆ
(D) +
∑
ℓ∈[k]
O
(
Λ2
ε
·
√
|GDℓ | · kn · log
(
n
β
))
= costZ
ζˆ
(D) +O

Λ2
ε
·
√
kn · log
(
n
β
)
·
∑
ℓ∈[k]
√
|GDℓ |


≤ costZ
ζˆ
(D) +O
(
k · Λ2
ε
·
√
|Z| · n · log
(
n
β
))
= costZ
ζˆ
(D) +O
(
k1.5 · Λ2
ε
·
√
n · log
(
n
β
)
log(
1
β
)
)
,
where the last inequality follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality (and by recalling that
∑
ℓ |GDℓ | =
|Z|). The analysis for the reverse direction is identical.
By now we have established that (w.h.p.), the set Y contains a subset of k centers with low cost
w.r.t. S, and in addition, for every set of k centers D ⊆ Y we have that costZ
ζˆ
(D) ≈ costZζ(D) ≈
costS(D). Hence, we can use the (privately computed) weighted set Zζˆ as a proxy in order to
identify k centers from Y with low cost w.r.t. S. This is formalized in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.16. Algorithm WeightedCenters satisfies (ε, δ)-LDP. In addition, when executed on a
(distributed) database S containing n points in the d-dimensional ball B(0,Λ), the algorithm returns
a set of k centers D such that with probability at least 1−O(β) we have
costS(D) ≤ O(1) ·OPTS(k) + O˜
(√
kn+ n0.5+a+b · √d
ε
· k · Λ2
)
,
where a > b > 0 are arbitrarily small constants (the constant hiding in the multiplicative error
depends on a and b).
Proof. The privacy properties of WeightedCenters are straightforward (follow from composition
and post-processing). We now proceed with the utility analysis. Let YS ⊆ Y be a subset of k centers
in Y minimizing costS(·), and let YZ
ζˆ
⊆ Y be a subset of k centers in Y minimizing costZ
ζˆ
(·). The
output (from Step 9) is a subset K ⊆ Y of size |K| = k such that
costZ
ζˆ
(K) ≤ O(1) · costZ
ζˆ
(YZ
ζˆ
) ≤ O(1) · costZ
ζˆ
(YS).
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By Claim 4.15 (relating the cost w.r.t. Zζ and w.r.t. Zζˆ), we have that
costZζ(K) ≤ O(1) · costZζ(YS) +O
(
k1.5 · Λ2
ε
·
√
n · log
(
n
β
)
log(
1
β
)
)
.
By Claim 4.14 (relating the cost w.r.t. Zζ and w.r.t. S), we have that
costS(K) ≤ O(1) · costS(YS) +O
(
k1.5 · Λ2
ε
·
√
n · log
(
n
β
)
log(
1
β
)
)
+O(1) ·OPTS(k) +O
(
k
ε
· n0.5+a+b ·
√
d · log(k
β
) log
(
dn
δ
)
log(n) · Λ2
)
.
Recall that in Claim 4.7 we showed that ∃W ∗ ⊆ W ⊆ Y of size |W ∗| = k with low k-means cost.
In particular, this means that costS(YS) is comparable to OPTS(k). Hence,
costS(K) ≤ O(1) ·OPTS(k) +O
(
k1.5 · Λ2
ε
·
√
n · log
(
n
β
)
log(
1
β
)
)
+O
(
k
ε
· n0.5+a+b ·
√
d · log(k
β
) log
(
dn
δ
)
log(n) · Λ2
)
.
5 A Lower Bound on the Additive Error
In this section we present a simple lower bound on the error of every constant-round LDP algorithm
for approximating the k-means. To get our lower bound, we show a reduction from the following
problem, called Gap-Threshold, to the k-means problem, and then use an existing lower bound for
the Gap-Threshold problem.
Definition 5.1 (Beimel et al. [8]). For τ > 0 and x1, . . . , xn ∈ {0, 1},
GAP-TRτ (x1, . . . , xn) =
{
0, If
∑
i∈[n] xi ≤ 0
1, If
∑
i∈[n] xi ≥ τ
Note that GAP-TRτ (x1, . . . , xn) is not defined when 0 <
∑
i∈[n] xi < τ .
Theorem 5.2. There exists constant 0 < ε, β < 1 such that the following holds. Let δ = o
(
1
n logn
)
,
and let A be an O(1)-round (ε, δ)-LDP protocol for computing GAP-TRτ with success probability
1− β. Then τ = Ω(√n).
Theorem 5.2 is stated in [8] only for δ = 0, but their analysis easily extends to the δ > 0 case.
We now show that this theorem implies a lower bound of Ω(
√
n) on the additive error of O(1)-round
LDP algorithms for the k-means, even when the dimension d is 1 and k = 2.
Theorem 5.3. There exists constant 0 < ε, β < 1 such that the following holds. Let δ = o
(
1
n logn
)
,
and let A be an O(1)-round (ε, δ)-LDP protocol that operates on a (distributed) database X ∈
([0, 1])n, and outputs a set C of k = 2 centers such that with probability 1− β we have costX(C) ≤
γ ·OPTX(k) + τ , for any γ <∞. Then τ = Ω(
√
n).
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Proof. Let β, ε be the constants from Theorem 5.2. Let A be an O(1)-round (ε, δ)-LDP protocol
that operates on a (distributed) database X ∈ ([0, 1])n and outputs a set C of size k = 2. We use
A to construct a protocol for GAP-TR, described in protocol B.
Protocol B
Setting: Each user i ∈ [n] holds a bit bi ∈ {0, 1}. Define S = (b1, . . . , bn).
Parameter: r = β/4, where β is the constant from Theorem 5.2.
1. The server: Let R = {[0, r], [r, 2r], . . . , [1− r, 1]}, sample (uniformly) an interval I ∈ R, and
let µ denote the center of I. Send µ to all the users.
2. Every user i: If bi = 0 then ignore µ and set xi = 0. Otherwise, set xi = µ.
2. The server and the users: Execute protocol A on the database X = (x1, . . . , xn) to obtain
a set of centers C = {c1, c2}.
3. The server: If c1 ∈ I or c2 ∈ I then return 1. otherwise return 0.
By Theorem 5.2, there exists a constant β > 0, an error parameter τ = Ω(
√
n), and a database
S∗ ∈ {0, 1}n such that B(S∗) 6= GAP-TRτ (S∗) with probability at least 1− β. We now show that
S∗ cannot be the all zero database. To that end, observe that if the input S is the all zero database,
then all of the users in the protocol B ignore µ, and hence, algorithm A gets no information on the
selected interval I. In that case, the probability that one of c1, c2 falls in I is at most 2r. That
is, the probability that B(~0) 6= 0 = GAP-TRτ (~0) is at most 2r = β/2. Therefore, the database S∗
(on which B errs with probability at least β) is not the all zero database ~0. Hence, S∗ contains at
least τ ones. Therefore, whenever B errs on S∗, we have that costX(C) ≥
(
r
2
)2 · τ = Ω(√n), even
though OPTX(k) = 0. This happens with probability at least β, which completes the proof.
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A Candidate Centers with Additional Properties: The Missing
Details
A.1 Additional Preliminaries
A.1.1 Average of vectors in Rd under LDP
Consider a (distributed) database X = (x1, . . . , xn) where every user i is holding xi ∈ Rd. One of
the most basic tasks we can apply under local differential privacy is to compute a noisy estimation
for the sum (or the average) of vectors in X. Specifically, every user sends the server a noisy
estimation of its vector (e.g., by adding independent Gaussian noise to each coordinate), and the
server simply sums all of the noisy reports to obtain an estimation for the sum of X.
Theorem A.1 (folklore). Consider a (distributed) database X = (x1, . . . , xn) where every user
i is holding a point xi in the d dimensional ball B(0,Λ). There exists an (ε, δ)-LDP protocol for
computing an estimation a for the sum of the vectors in X, such that with probability at least (1−β)
we have ∥∥∥∥∥∥a−
∑
i∈[n]
xi
∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤
2Λ
√
nd ln( 2βδ )
ε
.
For our constructions we will need a tool for computing averages of subsets of X. Specifically,
assume that there are n users, where user i is holding a point xi ∈ Rd. Moreover, assume that we
have a fixed (publicly known) partition of Rd into a finite number of regions: R1, . . . , RT ⊆ Rd.
For every region Rℓ, we would like to obtain an estimation for the average of the input points in
that region. For this purpose we introduce the following simple protocol, called LDP-AVG.
Protocol LDP-AVG
Public parameters: Partition of Rd into t regions R1, . . . , RT .
Setting: Each user i ∈ [n] holds a point xi ∈ Rd. Define X = (x1, . . . , xn).
1. Every user i: Let yi = (yi,1, . . . , yi,T ) ∈ (Rd)T be a vector whose every coordinate is an
independent Gaussian noise. Specifically, every yi,t ∈ Rd is a vector whose every coordinate
is sampled i.i.d. from N(0, σ2t ), for σt =
8·diam(Rt)
ε
√
ln(1.25/δ). Let t be s.t. xi ∈ Rt. Add xi
to yi,t. Send yi to the server.
2. The server and the users: Run the protocol from Theorem 2.5 with privacy parameter ε2 .
For every t ∈ [T ] the server obtains an estimation rˆt ≈ |{i : xi ∈ Rt}| , rt.
3. The server: Output a vector aˆ ∈ (Rd)T , where aˆt = 1rˆt ·
∑
i∈[n] yi,t.
Claim A.2. LDP-AVG satisfies (ε, δ)-LDP. Moreover, with probability at least (1 − β), for every
t ∈ [T ] s.t. rt ≥ 12ε ·
√
n · log
(
4T
β
)
we have that
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
rˆt
·
∑
i∈[n]
yi,t − 1
rt
·
∑
i∈[n]:
xi∈Rt
xi
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤
48
√
dn · ln(8dTβδ )
ε · rt · diam(Rt).
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Proof. The privacy properties of LDP-AVG follow from the privacy properties of the Gaussian mecha-
nism and the protocol from Theorem 2.5, together with composition. Observe that by Theorem 2.5,
with probability at least (1− β2 ), for every t ∈ [T ] we have |rt− rˆt| ≤ 6ε ·
√
n · log
(
4T
β
)
. We continue
with the analysis assuming that this is the case. Fix t ∈ [T ] such that rt ≥ 12ε ·
√
n · log
(
4T
β
)
, and
observe that rˆt ≥ rt/2. Denote ∆t = diam(Rt). Using a standard tail bound for normal variables,
with probability at least 1− β2T we have that
∥∥∥∥∥∑i∈[n] yi,t −∑ i∈[n]:xi∈Rt xi
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ 12
√
dnΛt·ln( 4dTβδ )
ε . Hence,
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
rˆt
·
∑
i∈[n]
yi,t − 1
rt
·
∑
i∈[n]:
xi∈Rt
xi
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤
∣∣∣∣ 1rˆt −
1
rt
∣∣∣∣ ·
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
i∈[n]
yi,t
∥∥∥∥∥∥+
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
rt
·

∑
i∈[n]
yi,t −
∑
i∈[n]:
xi∈Rt
xi


∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤
∣∣∣∣ 1rˆt −
1
rt
∣∣∣∣ ·

12
√
dnΛt · ln(4dTβδ )
ε
+
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
i∈[n]:
xi∈Rt
xi
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥

+ 12
√
dnΛt · ln(4dTβδ )
ε · rt
=
∣∣∣∣ 1rˆt −
1
rt
∣∣∣∣ · 12
√
dnΛt · ln(4dTβδ )
ε
+
∣∣∣∣ 1rˆt −
1
rt
∣∣∣∣ ·
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
i∈[n]:
xi∈Rt
xi
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
+
12
√
dnΛt · ln(4dTβδ )
ε · rt
≤ 2
rt
·
12
√
dnΛt · ln(4dTβδ )
ε
+
|rt − rˆt|
|rt · rˆt| ·
∑
i∈[n]:
xi∈Rt
‖xi‖+
12
√
dnΛt · ln(4dTβδ )
ε · rt
≤
36
√
dnΛt · ln(4dTβδ )
ε · rt +
|rt − rˆt|
|rt · rˆt| · Λt · rt
≤
36
√
dnΛt · ln(4dTβδ )
ε · rt +
12Λt ·
√
n · log
(
8T
β
)
ε · rt
≤
48
√
dnΛt · ln(8dTβδ )
ε · rt .
The claim now follows from a union bound.
A.1.2 Random rotation
We also use the following technical lemma to argue that if a set of points P is contained within a
ball of radius r in Rd, then by randomly rotating the Euclidean space we get that (w.h.p.) P is
contained within an axis-aligned rectangle with side-length ≈ r/√d.
Lemma A.3 (e.g., [28]). Let P ∈ (Rd)m be a set of m points in the d dimensional Euclidean space,
and let Z = (z1, . . . , zd) be a random orthonormal basis for R
d. Then,
Pr
Z
[
∀x, y ∈ P : ∀1 ≤ i ≤ d : |〈x− y, zi〉| ≤ 2
√
ln(dm/β)/d · ‖x− y‖
]
≥ 1− β.
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A.1.3 Locality sensitive hashing
A locality sensitive hash function aims to maximize the probability of a collision for similar items,
while minimizing the probability of collision for dissimilar items. Formally,
Definition A.4 ([17]). Let M be a metric space, and let r>0, c>1, 0≤q<p≤1. A family H of
functions mapping M into domain U is an (r, cr, p, q) locality sensitive hashing family (LSH) if for
all x, y ∈ M (i) Prh∈RH[h(x) = h(y)] ≥ p if dM(x, y) ≤ r; and (ii) Prh∈RH[h(x) = h(y)] ≤ q if
dM(x, y) ≥ cr.
A.2 Algorithm CentersProcedure
Algorithm CentersProcedure
Input: Radius r, target number of points t, failure probability β, privacy parameter ε.
Tool used: Family H of (r, c · r, p, q)-locality sensitive hash functions mapping Rd to a universe U .
Setting: Each player j ∈ [n] holds a value xj ∈ B(0,Λ). Define S = (x1, . . . , xn).
1. Sample a hash function h ∈ H mapping Rd to U .
2. Use Theorem 2.5 with ε4 to identify a list L ⊆ U such that
(a) Every u ∈ U s.t. |{x ∈ S : h(x) = u}| ≥ t16 · n−b is in L,
(b) For every u ∈ L we have |{x ∈ S : h(x) = u}| ≥ t32 · n−b,
(c) The list L is of size at most 32n1+b/t.
3. Let Z = (z1, . . . , zd) be a random orthonormal basis of R
d, and denote p = 2rc
√
ln(dnβ )/d.
Also let I = {I1, I2, . . . , I4Λ/p} be a partition of [−2Λ, 2Λ] into intervals of length p.
4. Randomly partition S into subsets S1, . . . , Sd of size |Si| = nd . For every basis vector zi ∈ Z,
use Theorem 2.5 with ε4 to obtain for every pair (I, u) ∈ I×U an estimation ai(I, u) for
|{x ∈ Si : h(x) = u and 〈x, zi〉 ∈ I}|.
5. For every basis vector zi ∈ Z and for every hash value u ∈ L, denote I(i, u) =
argmaxI∈I{ai(I, u)}, and define the interval Iˆ(i, u) by extending I(i, u) by p to each direction
(that is, Iˆ(i, u) is of length 3p).
6. For every hash value u ∈ L, let B(u) denote the box in Rd whose projection on every axis
zi ∈ Z is Iˆ(i, u).
7. Use algorithm LDP-AVG to obtain, for every u ∈ L, an approximation yˆu for the average of
{x ∈ S : h(x) = u and x ∈ B(u)} .
8. Use Theorem 2.5 with ε4 to identify a for every u ∈ L an estimation vˆ(u) ≈ v(u) , |{x ∈ S :
h(x) = u and ‖x− yˆu‖ ≤ 5cr}|. Delete from L every element u ∈ L such that vˆ(u) ≤ t4 · n−b.
9. Output the set of centers Y = {yˆu : u ∈ L}, the list L, and the hash function h.
Observation A.5. Algorithm CentersProcedure satisfies ε-LDP.
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We now proceed with the utility analysis of algorithm CentersProcedure. We will assume the
existence of a family H of (r, cr, p=n−b, q=n−2−a)-sensitive hash functions mapping Rd to a universe
U , for some constants a > b, r > 0, and c > 1.
Lemma A.6. Let β, ε, δ, n, d,Λ, r be such that Λ/r ≤ poly(n) and t ≥ O
(
n0.5+b·
√
d
ε log
(
dn
βδ
))
and
β ≤ n−a/28. Let S = (x1, . . . , xn) be a distributed database where every xi is a point in the d-
dimensional ball B(0,Λ), and let CentersProcedure be executed on S with the family H and with
parameters r, t, β, ε, δ. The algorithm outputs a list of hash values L, a hash function h, and a set
Y containing a center yˆu for every u ∈ L, such that
1. The list L and the set Y are size at most 32·n
1+b
t each.
2. W.p. at least 1−β, for every u ∈ L we have |{x ∈ S : h(x) = u and ‖x− yˆu‖ ≤ 5cr}| ≥ t8 ·n−b.
3. Let P ⊆ S be a set of t points which can be enclosed in a ball of radius r. With probability
at least n−a/4 there exists u∗ ∈ L such that the ball of radius 3cr around yˆu∗ ∈ Y contains at
least one point from P .
Proof. Items 1 and 2 of the lemma follow from the fact that in Step 8 we delete from the list L every
element u that does not satisfy the condition of item 2. Specifically, for t ≥ O
(
1
εn
0.5+b
√
log( 1β )
)
,
our estimations in Step 8 are accurate enough such that the item holds with probability at least
1 − β, in which case the list L is short (a longer list can be trimmed). We now proceed with the
analysis of item 3.
First observe that, w.l.o.g., we can assume that the range U of every function in H is of
size |U | ≤ n3. If this is not the case, then we can simply apply a (pairwise independent) hash
function with range n3 onto the output of the locally sensitive hash function. Clearly, this will not
decrease the probability of collusion for “close” elements (within distance r), and moreover, this
can increase the probability of collusion for “non-close” elements (at distance at least cr) by at
most n−3 = o(n−2−a) = o(q).
Now recall that by the properties of the family H, for every x, y ∈ Rd s.t. ‖x− y‖ ≥ cr we have
that Prh∈H[h(x) = h(y)] ≤ q = n−2−a. Using the union bound we get
Pr
h∈RH
[h(x) 6= h(y) for all x, y ∈ S s.t. ‖x− y‖ ≥ cr] ≥ (1− n−a/2).
Let P ⊆ S denote the guaranteed set of t input points that are contained in a ball of radius r,
and let x ∈ P be an arbitrary point in P . By linearity of expectation, we have that
E
h∈H
[|{y ∈ P : h(y) 6= h(x)}|] ≤ t(1− p) = t(1− n−b).
Hence, by Markov’s inequality,
Pr
h∈H
[
|{y ∈ P : h(y) 6= h(x)}| ≥ t(1− n
−b)
1− n−a
]
≤ 1− n−a.
So,
Pr
h∈H
[
|{y ∈ P : h(y) = h(x)}| ≥ t
(
1− 1− n
−b
1− n−a
)]
≥ n−a.
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Simplifying, for large enough n (specifically, for na−b ≥ 2) we get
Pr
h∈H
[
|{y ∈ P : h(y) = h(x)}| ≥ t
2
· n−b
]
≥ n−a.
So far we have established that with probability at least n−a/2 over the choice of h ∈ H in
Step 1 the following events occur:
(E1) For every x, y ∈ S s.t. ‖x− y‖ ≥ cr it holds that h(x) 6= h(y); and,
(E2) There exists a hash value in U , denoted u
∗, such that |{y ∈ P : h(y) = u∗}| ≥ t2 · n−b.
Event (E1) states that if two points in S are mapped into the same hash value, then these
points are close. Event (E2) states that there is a “heavy” hash value u
∗ ∈ U , such that “many” of
the points in P are mapped into u∗. We proceed with the analysis assuming that these two events
occur.
On step 2, we identify a list L containing all such “heavy” hash values u ∈ U . Assuming that
t ≥ O
(
1
ε · n0.5+b ·
√
log(n/β)
)
, Theorem 2.5 ensures that with probability at least 1 − β we have
that u∗ ∈ L. We continue with the analysis assuming that this is the case.
On Step 3 we generate a random orthonormal basis Z. By Lemma A.3, with probability at
least (1−β), for every x, y ∈ S and for every zi ∈ Z, we have that the projection of (x− y) onto zi
is of length at most 2
√
ln(dn/β)/d · ‖x− y‖. In particular, for every hash value u ∈ L we have that
the projection of Su , {x ∈ S : h(x) = u} onto every axis zi ∈ Z fits within an interval of length
at most p = 2rc
√
ln(dn/β)/d. Recall that we assume that input point come from B(0,Λ). Hence,
for every x, y ∈ S we have (x− y) ∈ B(0, 2Λ). Now, as I = {I1, I2, . . . } is a partition of [−2Λ, 2Λ]
into intervals of length p, for every axis zi ∈ Z and for every u ∈ U , we have that the projection of
Su onto zi is contained within 1 or 2 consecutive intervals from I.
On step 4 we partition S into d subsets Si ⊆ S of size nd . By the Hoeffding bound, assuming
that t ≥ 2 · n0.5+b ·
√
2d ln(2dβ ), with probability at least 1 − β, for every i ∈ [d], we have that
|Si ∩ Su∗ | ≥ |Su∗ |2d ≥ t·n
−b
4d . Recall that the projection of Su∗ onto every axis zi ∈ Z fits within
(at most) 2 consecutive intervals from I. Hence, for every axis zi ∈ Z, at least 1 interval from
I contains at least half of the points from Si ∩ Su∗ , i.e., at least t·n−b8d points. Therefore, for
t ≥ O
(
1
ε · n0.5+b ·
√
d · log(dnβ )
)
, Theorem 2.5 ensures that with probability at least 1−β, for every
zi ∈ Z we have that I(i, u∗) = argmaxi∈I{ai(I, u∗)} (defined on step 5) contains at least one point
from Su∗ .
2 Hence, the interval Iˆ(i, u∗) obtained by extending I(i, u∗) by p to each direction, contains
(the projection of) all of the points from Su∗ (onto the i
th axis). As a result, the box B(u∗), defined
on step 7 as the box whose projection onto every axis i is Iˆ(i, u∗), contains all of Su∗ . We continue
with the analysis assuming that this is the case. Observe that the diameter of B(u∗), as well as the
diameter of every other box B(u) defined on step 6, is at most 3p
√
d = 6cr
√
ln(dn/β) = O˜(cr).
On step 7 we use algorithm LDP-AVG to obtain, for every u ∈ L, an estimation yˆu for the average
of {x ∈ S : h(x) = u and x ∈ B(u)}. Let us denote the true average of every such set as yu. By the
properties of LDP-AVG (Claim A.2), assuming that t ≥ O
(
1
ε ·
√
dn · log
(
dn
βδ
))
, with probability at
2The constraint on t in Theorem 2.5 depends logarithmically on the number of possible bins. In our case, there
are 4Λ/p ≤ Λ
√
d/r ≤ poly(n
√
d) possible bins, where the last inequality is because we assumed that Λ/r ≤ poly(n).
30
least 1 − β we have that ‖yu∗ − yˆu∗‖2 ≤ cr. We continue with the analysis assuming that this is
the case.
Observe that yu∗ is the average of (some of) the points in Su∗, and that every two points in Su∗
are within distance cr from each other. Hence, we get that a ball of radius 2cr around yu∗ contains
all of Su∗ . In particular, as Su∗ contains at least some of the points from P (the guaranteed cluster
radius r with t input points from S), we have that the ball of radius 2cr around yu∗ contains at
least 1 point from P , and that the ball of radius 4cr around yu∗ contains all of P . Therefore, as
‖yu∗ − yˆu∗‖2 ≤ cr we get that a ball of radius 3cr around yˆu∗ contains at least one point from P ,
and that the ball of radius 5cr around yˆu∗ contains all of P .
Recall that, by Event (E2), there are at least
t
2 · n−b input points x ∈ P such that h(x) = u∗.
Therefore, in Step 8 we have that v(u∗) ≥ t2 ·n−b. Therefore, with probability at least 1−β we also
have that vˆ(u∗) ≥ t2 · n−b, because when t ≥ O
(
1
εn
0.5+b
√
log( 1β )
)
then the error |v(u∗)− vˆ(u∗)| is
small compared to v(u∗). This means that u∗ is not deleted from the list L in Step 8.
Overall, with probability at least n
−a
2 −7β we have that the output set Y (from Step 9) contains
at least one vector yˆu∗ s.t. the ball of radius 3cr around yˆ contains at least one point from P .
A.3 Algorithm GoodCenters
Algorithm GoodCenters
Input: Radius r, target number of points t, failure probability β, privacy parameters ε, δ.
Optional input: Parameter t. Otherwise set t = O
(
1
ε · n0.5+a+b ·
√
d · log( 1β ) log
(
dn
βδ
))
.
Setting: Each player j ∈ [n] holds a value xj ∈ B(0,Λ). Define S = (x1, . . . , xn).
1. Denote M = 4na ln( 1β ) and randomly partition [n] into M subsets I1, . . . , Im ⊆ [n]. For
m ∈ [M ] define Sm = {xi ∈ S : i ∈ Im}.
2. For m ∈ [M ] apply algorithm CentersProcedure on Sm with the the following parameters:
radius r, failure probability βˆ = β7M , privacy parameters ε, δ, and target number of points
tˆ = t2M . For every m ∈ [M ] denote the outcomes as Ym, Lm, and hm.
3. Return the sets of centers Y1, . . . , YM , the lists L1, . . . , LM , the hash functions h1, . . . , hM ,
and the partition I1, . . . , IM .
Theorem A.7. Let β, ε, δ, n, d,Λ, r be such that t ≥ O
(
n0.5+a+b·
√
d
ε log(
1
β ) log
(
dn
βδ
))
and such
that Λ/r ≤ poly(n). Let S = (x1, . . . , xn) be a distributed database where every xi is a point in
the d-dimensional ball B(0,Λ), and let GoodCenters be executed on S with parameters r, t, β, ε, δ.
Denote M = 4na ln( 1β ). The algorithm outputs a partition I1, . . . , IM ⊆ [n], lists L1, . . . , LM , hash
functions h1, . . . , hM , and sets of centers Y1, . . . , YM , where for every m ∈ [M ] and u ∈ Lm, the set
Ym contains a center yˆm,u. The following holds.
1. With probability at least 1 − β, for every m ∈ [M ] and u ∈ Lm we have |{i ∈ Im : hm(xi) =
u and ‖xi − yˆm,u‖ ≤ 5cr}| ≥ t16M · n−b.
2. Denote Y =
⋃
i∈[M ] Ym. Then |Y | ≤ 512·n
1+a+b
t ln(
1
β ).
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3. Let P ⊆ S be a set of t points which can be enclosed in a ball of radius r. With probability at
least 1− β there exists yˆ ∈ Y such that the ball of radius 5cr around yˆ contains all of P .
Proof. Items 1 and 2 of the lemma follow directly from the properties of algorithm CentersProcedure.
We now proceed with the analysis of item 3. Let P ⊆ S be s.t. |P | = t and diam(P ) ≤ r, and
consider the following good event, which happens with probability at least 1 − β by the Chernoff
bound (assuming that t ≥ 24M ln(eMβ )).
Event E1 (over partitioning S into S1, . . . , SM):
(a) For every m ∈ [M ] we have |P ∩ Sm| ≥ t2M .
(b) For every m ∈ [M ] we have n2M ≤ |Im| ≤ 2nM .
We proceed with the analysis assuming that Event E1 occurred. Let us say that the mth execu-
tion of CentersProcedure succeeds if ∃ym ∈ Ym such that the ball of radius 3cr around ym contains
at least one point from P ∩ Sm. Recall that we assume that t ≥ O
(
n0.5+a+b·
√
d
ε log(
1
β ) log(
dn
βδ )
)
.
Hence, by the properties of algorithm CentersProcedure, every single execution succeeds with
probability at least n−a/4. As the different executions of CentersProcedure are independent,
when M ≥ 4na ln( 1β ), the probability that at least one execution succeeds is at least 1− β. In this
case, there is a point y ∈ Y = Y1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ym such that the ball of radius 3cr around it contains at
least one point from P , and hence, the ball of radius 5cr around y contains all of P .
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